HOW TO DEAL WITH THE KREMLIN-CREATED CRISIS IN EUROPE
Ukraine Alert, Atlantic Council
Dec 30, 2021
Editor’s note: Moscow’s buildup of troops on and near Ukraine’s borders and bellicose rhetoric have raised the prospect of a major conventional war in Europe. The phone call today between US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin underscores the dangers of this Kremlin-manufactured crisis. Below is a statement by twenty-four distinguished experts and former senior officials offering their ideas on how to deter Moscow from escalating its current war of aggression against Ukraine and more broadly to discourage Moscow from future provocations. The statement represents the views of the signatories and not of their institutions.
Since President Biden’s virtual summit with President Putin on December 7, Russia has increased its troop presence on or near Ukraine’s borders. Having created this crisis, the Kremlin has demanded security guarantees for Russia that the United States and its allies cannot possibly provide. It has made provocative statements at high levels, including outlandish claims that US private military contractors intend to launch a chemical weapons attack in eastern Ukraine. Moscow wrongly asserts that NATO enlargement has created a military threat to Russia; the Alliance has fully abided by its commitments in the NATO-Russia Founding Act to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons or permanently stationing substantial combat forces on the territory of new member states, despite the fact that Russia has violated many of its own Founding Act commitments, as well as the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, and the Budapest Memorandum.
In short, Moscow appears to be setting the stage for launching a major conventional assault on Ukraine, even though the United States and NATO have shown a willingness to sit down and discuss Kremlin concerns.
We believe the United States should, in closest consultation with its NATO allies and with Ukraine, take immediate steps to affect the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculations before the Russian leadership opts for further military escalation. This means raising the costs that would ensue should the Russian military launch a new assault on Ukraine, building on the excellent set of measures the Biden administration has already laid out: enacting punishing sanctions on Moscow, sending major military supplies to Ukraine, and strengthening NATO’s force posture on its eastern flank.
The administration should continue its good work with the European Union and other partners to ensure agreement on the elements of a response to any Russian assault on Ukraine, regardless of the extent or form of Russia’s escalation. Such a response would include a package of major and painful sanctions that would be applied immediately if Russia assaults Ukraine. Ideally, the outline of these sanctions would be communicated now to Moscow, so that the Kremlin has a clear understanding of the magnitude of the economic hit it will face. In particular, Washington should consult with Berlin and secure German agreement that it would prevent Nord Stream 2
from going into operation in the event of a Russian attack, making clear that otherwise the administration will not again waive sanctions on the pipeline.
The most important thing that the West can do now is to enhance the deterrent strength of Ukraine’s armed forces by providing military assistance and equipment on an expedited basis. For the Kremlin, a large invasion of Ukraine works only if Russian forces are able to seize and hold Ukrainian territory without sustaining significant and constant casualties. Western countries should act now to equip Ukraine’s military and territorial defense units with additional capabilities that can impose such costs.
Western military officials should consult urgently with their Ukrainian counterparts as to what assistance and equipment the Ukrainian military needs and could most quickly integrate into its operations to bolster its defensive strength. Such assistance might include additional Javelin anti-armor missiles and Q36 counter-battery radar systems as well as Stinger and other anti-aircraft missiles. The Biden administration should also encourage NATO allies to do more to enhance Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, making clear that the entire NATO Alliance stands together in opposing Russian aggression.
We believe that NATO should act now to begin bolstering its military presence on its eastern flank and communicating to Moscow that Russia’s escalation would bring a substantial number of US and Allied forces and a permanent presence in the Baltic states and Black Sea region. NATO should also signal to Moscow that any additional deployments could be reconsidered if/when the current crisis abates.
The West should also widen its political counteroffensive to retake the initiative from Moscow as it tries to use the threat of force to intimidate Ukraine, Europe, and the United States into acquiescing to its demands, many of which are plainly unjustified and unacceptable. The Biden administration should seek a Group of Seven (G7) statement at the head of state level condemning Moscow’s threat of wider war against Ukraine and work with allies and partners to use other fora, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and possibly the United Nations, to highlight the unacceptability of Russian military action and coercive threats.
The Biden administration should consult with NATO, the European Union, Ukraine, and key allies such as Poland on extensive preparations for dealing with the humanitarian crisis that a major Russian invasion would create.
Finally, the United States and its allies should continue to make clear their readiness for dialogue with Russia, to include concerns of NATO and other parties about Russian military and other aggressive activities. They have indicated that some elements in the Russia-proposed US-Russia treaty and NATO-Russia agreement may offer a basis for discussion and possible negotiation. The United States and NATO should make clear to the Kremlin that it must de-escalate the threatening military situation around Ukraine before there can be any substantive negotiation, and any negotiation must involve all parties whose security interests will be affected. These issues cannot simply be resolved in a bilateral US-Russia channel. Moreover, any negotiation should be consistent with the principles agreed to by all NATO members, Russia, and Ukraine, such as those in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.
Signed,
Dr. Stephen Blank
Senior Fellow
Foreign Policy Research Institute
General Philip Breedlove,
USAF ret. 17th Supreme Allied Commander Europe Distinguished Professor, Sam Nunn School,
Georgia Institute of Technology
Ian Brzezinski
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy Senior Fellow Atlantic Council
Debra Cagan
Former US State and Defense
Department official
Distinguished Energy Fellow
Transatlantic Leadership Network
General Wesley K. Clark
US Army (ret.)
12th Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Senior Fellow,
UCLA Burkle Center
Dr. Larry Diamond
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Ambassador Paula Dobriansky
Former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Vice Chair, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Atlantic Council Senior Fellow,
Harvard University Belfer Center
Dr. Evelyn Farkas
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia,
Ukraine, and Eurasia
Ambassador Daniel Fried
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and US Ambassador to Poland, Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow Atlantic Council
Dr. Francis Fukuyama
Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow
Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Director, Ford Dorsey Masters in International Policy, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Stanford University
Melinda Haring
Deputy Director, Eurasia Center
Atlantic Council
John E. Herbst
Former US Ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan, Senior Director, Eurasia Center Atlantic Council
Lieutenant General (Ret.)
Ben Hodges
Former Commander US Army Europe
Dr. Donald N. Jensen
Director, Russia and Strategic Stability United States Institute of Peace
Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Center for a New American Security
Ambassador John Kornblum
Former US Ambassador to Germany
Senior Adviser (Non-resident),
Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program Center for Strategic
International Studies
Ambassador Michael McFaul
Former US Ambassador to Russia
Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Ambassador Steven Pifer
Former US Ambassador to Ukraine
Willian Perry Fellow
Stanford University
Herman Pirchner, Jr.
President
American Foreign Policy Council
John Sipher
Former Officer and Chief of Station, CIA Clandestine Service
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center Atlantic Council
Strobe Talbott
Former Deputy Secretary of State
Distinguished Fellow
The Brookings Institution
Ambassador William Taylor
Former US Ambassador to Ukraine
Vice President for
Strategic
Stability and Security
United States Institute of Peace
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
Former US Ambassador to Russia
Former Deputy Secretary
General of NATO
Distinguished Fellow,
Scowcroft Center for Strategy
and Security, Eurasia Center
Atlantic Council
Ambassador Kurt Volker
Former US Ambassador to NATO and US Special Representative
