On June 19, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy gave Alexander Lukashenko one week to remove communications equipment on Belarusian territory that Russia has been using to guide drone strikes against Ukrainian civilians. “If he doesn’t do it, we will,” Zelenskyy said. It was a direct military threat and perhaps the most consequential public ultimatum Ukraine has issued to a neighbouring state since the full-scale invasion began. Will Belarus join the war? The technical reality behind this warning has been building for months. Russia deployed a network of relay stations across Belarus, mounted on mobile communications towers, to improve the guidance and control of Shahed drones attacking northern Ukraine and Kyiv.
In February 2026, Ukraine destroyed several of these stations in a covert operation. Ukrainian officials later confirmed that the strikes had a measurable impact on air defence effectiveness around Kyiv and central Ukraine. But the infrastructure was rebuilt. Lukashenko, apparently, did not get the message. Ukraine subsequently sanctioned Lukashenko for allowing the deployment of this relay system, which has facilitated attacks on energy and railway infrastructure across northern Ukraine. Even that failed to alter Minsk’s behaviour.
For four years, Lukashenko has insisted that he does not want Belarus drawn into the war. That claim has always been fiction. Russian forces used Belarusian territory to launch the invasion in February 2022. Missiles fired from Belarus struck Ukrainian cities during the first days of the war. Russian troops massed in Belarus before the assault on Kyiv — the same offensive that produced the atrocities of Bucha and Irpin.
Lukashenko’s claims of non-involvement have never been credible. What has changed is that Ukraine is now saying so publicly and attaching a deadline. The question is whether Lukashenko even has the ability to comply. Ukraine has been reinforcing its northern frontier, creating new drone units specifically to address threats emanating from Belarus. Meanwhile, intelligence suggests that Russia intends to continue expanding ground-control infrastructure for long-range drones on Belarusian territory, pushing Minsk deeper into the war regardless of Lukashenko’s preferences.
The Belarusian dictator increasingly finds himself trapped between a Russia he cannot refuse and a Ukraine that has made clear it will act unilaterally if he does not. The strategic calculus is uncomfortable. Belarus possesses limited air-defense capabilities. Minsk lies less than 300 kilometers from the Ukrainian border — well within range of Ukrainian long-range strike systems. Much of the country’s economy depends on concentrated oil-refining infrastructure that is both valuable and vulnerable. And perhaps most importantly, the one promise that has kept Lukashenko politically afloat since the fraudulent election of 2020 — the implicit guarantee that Belarus would avoid becoming a battlefield — is now under direct pressure. A week is not a long time to make a consequential decision. But the alternative Zelenskyy has placed on the table may leave even less time.
Roman Sheremeta
