Paul Goble
Jamestown Foundation
May 7, 2026
On April 30, Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada approved legislation creating a commission to define what Ukraine should do next to “de-imperialize” the Russian Federation by promoting the interests and rights of smaller and indigenous nations of that country (Verkhovna Rada, April 30; Anti-imperial Block of Nations, May 1). Kyiv’s efforts to develop alliances with non-Russian ethnic minorities within the Russian Federation and activists forced to flee have attracted far less attention than its current use of drones against the invader. As Russia’s war against Ukraine drags on, Kyiv now appears ready to expand these efforts (Mezha, April 30). Kyiv has long been interested in ethnic Ukrainian communities inside Russian borders and other non-Russians there who have been oppressed by Moscow, viewing them as allies in Kyiv’s own fight against Russian imperialism. Since Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 and especially after Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion in 2022, these feelings have intensified. Parliamentarians and officials in Kyiv have increasingly reached out to non-Russian groups inside Russia, offering support for their aspirations and a safe haven for émigré ethnic activists (see EDM, October 13, 2023, August 8, 2024, October 16, 2025). They are also providing opportunities for their members to train and form military units to fight alongside the Ukrainians against Russia. (For a comprehensive and heavily footnoted discussion of what Kyiv has done so far, see EDM, June 24, 2025.) After many delays between proposals for action and actual moves, Ukraine appears ready to step up this effort in the hopes that it can use cooperation with the non-Russians to force Moscow to negotiate lest, by continuing the war, the Kremlin increases the chances of Russia’s disintegration. In the longer term, Ukrainians hope that with such moves, they can transform the territory east of Ukraine into a country or set of countries that can live in peace with Kyiv (Window on Eurasia, April 12, 2025).
The Verkhovna Rada’s new law does not provide details on what Kyiv will do next, but the temporary commission will likely build on the work of other parliamentary-created groups to guide the Ukrainian government’s approach (see EDM, June 24, 2025). Among these moves by Kyiv are the formation of ethnic units made up of non-Russians to fight alongside the Ukrainian army against the Russian invader, the declaration of Ukrainian support for issues of concern to these groups, and the provision of safe havens for ethnic activists forced to flee their homelands (Anti-imperial Block of Nations, February 23, 2024; see EDM, January 14, 2025). Kyiv has also continued to support special training programs for younger ethnic activists from the non-Russian regions of the Russian Federation and encouraged other countries to follow its lead. Ukrainian officials have supported cooperation between non-Russian activists and ethnic Russian émigrés in the hopes of making the latter more sympathetic to non-Russian aspirations while also expanding coverage of developments in the non-Russian parts of the Russian Federation, areas often overlooked in Western coverage or distorted by Russian propaganda.
Ukraine’s efforts in all these directions have been led by parliamentarians rather than by executive branch officials. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, however, has spoken on their behalf (see EDM, October 13, 2022; January 25, July 30, 2024). As a result, the Ukrainian government has sometimes lagged behind what Verkhovna Rada deputies want, largely because it must consider the immediate consequences of its actions (Window on Eurasia, October 11, 2025). The reasons for this pattern are the same as in other democracies. Parliaments can advance more radical positions, which governments then promote more vigorously or not, depending on their calculations of national interest at any given time. The Ukrainian government has often chosen to move more cautiously than the parliament. Actual Ukrainian actions on such issues are treated in isolation rather than as a core policy of the Ukrainian state, and thus do not receive the media attention they otherwise would.
Now, events are pushing the Ukrainian government to move in the direction that the parliamentarians want, something that may surprise some who believe that Ukraine has lost support among non-Russians due to its drone attacks on their territories. The reverse is almost certainly the case. Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian targets in non-Russian regions are not only highlighting the extent to which non-Russians are hostages to Russian goals but are also showing Russians that Moscow is unwilling or even unable to defend them, something likely to make them more prepared to oppose the Kremlin. Seen in this light, Ukraine’s drone attacks and its outreach to non-Russians within the current borders of the Russian Federation reinforce one another (Anti-imperial Block of Nations, May 29, 2024; Window on Eurasia, June 7, 2024).
That reality may be the primary reason the Verkhovna Rada has formed this group now, after months of delay. There are, however, at least five other reasons, all of which have become more compelling in recent months. First, Ukraine has concluded that it benefits from broadcasting to the world that Russia is an empire and that Russia must be transformed and the empire destroyed if the world is to have peace, not only in Ukraine but more broadly. Second, the formation of this group will intensify fears in Moscow that Russia is on the brink of chaos and possible disintegration and force the Kremlin to shift resources away from other priorities to counter this development. Third, while Ukraine’s support for the rights of non-Russians may help Putin gain
support from some ethnic Russians, it will cost him even more in the non-Russian regions and even convince an increasing number of Russians that they too need a new approach to governing their country. Fourth, as repression in Russia increases, ever more non-Russians may resist or even make their way to Ukraine to help fight Putin, something many in Moscow already see as opening the door to the potential disintegration of their country (see EDM, February 3). Fifth—and this is undoubtedly Kyiv’s primary concern at the moment as Putin’s war against Ukraine drags on into its fifth year—all this taken together will put pressure both within the Russian Federation and beyond on Putin to wrap up his war lest a failure to do so means that Russia will reap the whirlwind.
As a result, what may appear to some as a minor parliamentary action in Kyiv may prove to be as fateful as Ukraine’s drone attacks on the Russian Federation. More people, both in Russia and abroad, may even conclude that Ukraine’s drone attacks and its expansion of efforts to reach out to the non-Russians within the Russian Federation are in fact two sides of the same coin.
