Last week, Prime Minister Mark Carney and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took an important step toward the long-term defence of Canada and Ukraine.
Their new long-term partnership will expand co-operation on joint production of drones, counter-drone technologies and priority munitions, combining Ukrainian battlefield experience with Canadian manufacturing, software and AI. Such investments help Ukraine protect its cities while strengthening Canada’s own defence-industrial capacity.
But helping Ukraine resist Russian aggression abroad must be matched by a willingness to impose consequences on the Russian state and its agents here in Canada.
That means continuing to pursue accountability for Russian war criminals and scrutinizing the unusually large Russian official presence in Canada. Parliamentary testimony has put that presence at more than 60 Russian diplomats. Not every Russian diplomat is an intelligence officer. But it would be naïve to ignore Russia’s long-standing use of diplomatic postings as cover for intelligence and influence operations. Those who abuse diplomatic status to undermine Canadian security should be expelled.
In August, a man walking in front of the Russian Embassy in Ottawa approached a blue and a yellow balloon on a pole left outside by anti-war protesters. He punctured them and walked away. Video of the incident posted on X by Bulgarian investigative journalist Christo Grozev would be almost comic if the context were not so serious. Grozev identified the man as a Russian diplomat.
Canada’s security service, CSIS, has previously warned about hostile activities targeting Canada, including Russian intelligence and influence operations. A recent Senate committee report concluded that Russian disinformation in Canada has been growing and evolving rapidly. Such activities seek to sow discord, deepen social fractures and undermine democratic institutions. They include attempts to discredit Canada’s Ukrainian community by branding it “neo-Nazi,” blaming NATO for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and spreading falsehoods about the West’s response. The goal is to erode Canadian support for Ukraine and incite hostility toward Canadians of Ukrainian heritage.
The consequences are not theoretical. In February 2022, Toronto’s «Future Bakery» was vandalized with pro-Russian graffiti, including “Russia is power.” Weeks later, its Stand With Ukraine banner was slashed and splattered with paint.
When a Russian “diplomat” is filmed engaging in petty vandalism of Ukrainian-coloured protest symbols outside the Russian Embassy, it illustrates the atmosphere of contempt for freedom of expression and intimidation that Kremlin disinformation operations seek to create.
Canada needs to act publicly. Previous governments have done so. In 2018, Ottawa expelled four Russian diplomatic staff identified as intelligence officers or individuals who had used diplomatic status to undermine Canadian security or interfere in Canadian democracy. One was Russian Embassy press secretary Kirill Kalinin, whom investigative journalist Justin Ling later told Parliament had repeatedly tried to seed stories about alleged Ukrainian Nazis in Canada and sought to defame then Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland.
Kalinin’s expulsion should have set a precedent: diplomats who abuse their status to conduct disinformation warfare against Canadians will not be tolerated. Yet after Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Canada stopped using expulsions as a tool for imposing consequences.
Canada does not need to sever diplomatic relations with Russia. It should review Russia’s diplomatic footprint, in consultation with CSIS and allied intelligence services, and reduce it where officials are believed to be conducting intelligence, intimidation, disinformation or other activities incompatible with diplomatic status. Diplomatic accreditation should not be a shield for hostile-state activity.
Estonia offers a useful model. In March 2022, it expelled three Russian diplomats for undermining its security and spreading propaganda justifying Russia’s war. Weeks later, it expelled 14 Russian consular staff, including seven diplomats. In August 2025, Estonia expelled a Russian Embassy first secretary over activities its foreign ministry said undermined Estonia’s constitutional order and sought to divide Estonian society.
Former Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves put it plainly when asked about the Ottawa incident: “Foreign diplomats are not allowed to engage in political activity in the country where they are accredited. Vandalism already calls for a PNG designation.”
Canada already knows the standard. In its response to a 2023 House of Commons recommendation, the government agreed that Russian diplomats engaged in activities inconsistent with their official status should be expelled. Canada can also declare a foreign representative persona non grata under the Vienna conventions without publicly explaining its decision.
Canada should apply that standard now. Global Affairs Canada and CSIS should confirm the identity of the individual in the video, examine his connections to the embassy, and review his diplomatic accreditation, activities and role. If his conduct is incompatible with his status or Canada’s security interests, he should be required to leave the country.
Balloons on their own may be trivial. What Canada is prepared to tolerate from Vladimir Putin’s “diplomats” and agents is not.
The new Canada-Ukraine defence partnership is an important investment in deterrence abroad. It should be matched by consequences for hostile Russian activity at home, including the expulsion of officials who abuse diplomatic cover. Estonia has demonstrated that such consequences can be imposed. Canada should be prepared to do the same.
Stanley Kutcher and Marcus Kolga
National Post
