16 September proved to be a pivotal day in Ukraine’s shaky post-revolution history. In addition to the ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, Ukrainian parliament passed three bills, all of which are intimately related to the November protests of last year, sparked by ex-president Yanukovych’s decision to back out of the Association Agreement at the last minute.
One of the bills responded to the much-called for demands of lustration of government officials, reflecting the spirit and a core raison d’être of the Euromaidan revolution. The others were more controversial, giving the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (collectively, the Donbass) special status for the next three years, as well as granting “participants in the events in the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” general amnesty. President Poroshenko claims that such concessions will help bring peace to Ukraine’s east, while also initiating a first step towards decentralization and guaranteeing Ukraine’s “sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.”
The simultaneous ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement by the EU and Ukrainian parliaments was presented as a major victory, the achievement of a long and hard fought battle that began with a modest student protest back in November.
But a closer look reveals that celebrating this newly passed legislation is somewhat misguided. In reality, it is a stark reminder of Russia’s ever-looming presence, its refusal to allow Ukraine to choose its own path as an independent, sovereign country, and its inability to let go of a twisted, centuries old idea that Ukraine and its citizens are inherently Russian property.
Take for example the Association Agreement. Indeed, Ukrainians have paid the ultimate price for its realization. As Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (EPP, PL) commented before the vote, “Ukrainian society has paid the highest price for its European aspirations, grieving the deaths of numerous people, suffering territorial occupation by Russia and experiencing deteriorating economic conditions.” But while the Agreement was ratified on 16 September, in a cruel twist of fate it was earlier agreed by EU, Ukrainian, and Russian trade representatives, behind closed doors, that the EU-Ukraine trade deal would not be implemented until early 2016, a move designed to soothe Russian claims that the deal would cost Russia around $3 billion.
What right Russia had to such a seat at the table, one that determined Ukraine’s trade relations with another sovereign entity, is unclear. That over 3,000 Ukrainians have lost their lives due to the Russian involvement in and invasion of Ukraine, and the de facto loss of Ukrainian territory to Russian proxies, appears to be inconsequential. Russia under Putin was never willing to let Ukraine escape its sphere of influence, and on 12 September, after months of fighting, thousands of lives lost, and massively destroyed Ukrainian infrastructure, Russia finally achieved its much sought after position in talks that were meant to help Ukraine distance itself from Russia and its Soviet past. This should serve as a reminder to the West that Russia will stop at nothing when it feels as if it might be losing control over its perceived spheres of influence.
Even more concerning is the Verkhovna Rada’s passing of Poroshenko’s bills granting special status to areas held in Donetsk and Luhansk by Russian-backed “separatist forces,” forces which will largely receive amnesty and are now considered an official party in negotiations. This legislation stems from the Minsk Protocol signed on 5 September between Ukraine, Russia and representatives of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR respectively) in an effort to end the war raging in Ukraine’s east.
The newly passed legislation stipulates that elections will be held in the two “special status” regions on 7 December, allows the use of the Russian language in the two regions’ state institutions, grants regional councils the power to appoint local judges, prosecutors, and “voluntary people’s police groups,” and allows for authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk to “strengthen good neighbourly relations” with Russian authorities, including signing cross-border cooperation agreements with territorial units of the Russian Federation.
As for the Ukrainian government, it will only be able to participate in governing these regions in Donetsk and Luhansk if special agreements are reached between Kyiv and DPR and LPR authorities. Despite Kyiv’s lack of involvement and control over these regions, it is mandated with providing them with economic and social assistance, as well as providing budgetary funding to restore the regional infrastructure and industry.
Understandably, there has been much backlash against this legislation, including in Donetsk itself. Many accuse Poroshenko of being naïve and acquiescing to Russian demands, an assessment not entirely off the mark. This “special status” in geographically unspecified regions in the Donbass will likely be disastrous for Ukraine in the short-term. Russia will more than likely capitalize on this opportunity to deepen its involvement in Ukraine’s east, primarily by continuing to appoint its people into positions of power. Anyone who doubts this need only look to Crimea to see what a Russian “democratic takeover” looks like.
Although the terms of the 5 September Minsk Protocol are nothing short of devastating for Ukraine, the reality is that Poroshenko had little other choice. Ex-president Yanukovych’s rule left the Ukrainian armed forces in a pitiful state, highly unprepared for a military invasion by an aggressor as large and powerful as Russia. And although Ukrainians have come together in an unprecedented volunteer effort to fend off the Russian invasion, realistically they did not have a chance at an outright military victory over their bigger, better-equipped foe.
As Commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, Poroshenko is well aware of this. He is also aware of the West’s growing fatigue with the “Ukraine crisis,” as conflicts elsewhere in the world draw attention and resources away from the one in Ukraine. And with winter coming, Europe is eager to secure the gas it requires from Russia.
But perhaps the most important reason for Poroshenko’s concessions in Minsk is the fact that the West was not willing to fight, in the real sense, for Ukraine. While it has sent (and continues to send) humanitarian, non-lethal, and financial assistance to Ukraine, applied numerous rounds of sanctions against Russia, and has been a strong supporter of Ukraine in the diplomatic sphere, it has failed to provide much needed lethal weapons and know-how to the beleaguered Ukrainian forces. While thousands of Ukrainians have paid the ultimate price fighting for freedom and democracy – principles upon which the Western society is allegedly built – the West, namely the EU and US, has remained reserved in its response, unwilling to provoke the Russian bear into an unwanted war.
Indeed, no one wants a war even larger than the one happening in Ukraine’s east today, but when dealing with a statesman like Putin, one who only respects power and all but completely disregards international law, it is sometimes necessary to respond to fire with fire. As things stand, Russia has achieved what it wanted with regards to Ukraine. Donetsk and Luhansk (and Crimea) have now become areas of frozen conflict with Russia, added to the list of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. The political ramifications that will result from such a situation will be serious. A frozen conflict in Ukraine’s east will effectively allow Russia to continue its destabilization policy in Ukraine, and will prevent Ukraine from being able to fully pursue its EU and NATO aspirations.
If we are to learn anything from what has happened in Ukraine, it is that Russia is only willing to play by the rules as long as the rules are suitable to Russian wants. Take this reality and apply it to the Donbas “special status” zones, and it will only be a matter of time before their “special status” morphs into a “Russian status.” Take it one step further and the West will soon realize that Russia will not stop in Donbas, just as it had not stopped in Crimea in March or Georgia in 2008. The question is not whether Russia will push ahead, but when. With Russian saber rattling already occurring in the Baltic states and elsewhere, Western nations need to seriously start asking themselves how much bullying they are willing to tolerate before they too are forced to fend off the Russian menace.
